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Abstract
We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in
rationalizable strategies. A strict (and thus stronger) version of the monotonicity condition
introduced by Maskin (1999) is necessary under the solution concept of rationalizability. As-
suming the social choice function is responsive (i.e., it never selects the same outcome in two
distinct states), we show that it is also su¢ cient under a mild ￿no worst alternative￿condition.
In particular, no economic condition is required. We also discuss how our results extend when
the social choice function is not responsive.
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11 Introduction
We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rational-
izable strategies. We say that a social choice function f is rationalizably implemented if there
exists a mechanism such that every rationalizable strategy pro￿le leads to the realization of the
social choice function f. A priori, implementation in rationalizable strategies does not require the
existence of a (pure or mixed) Nash equilibrium that leads to the realization of f, and hence this
implementation notion is neither stronger nor weaker than that of Nash implementation. How-
ever, we establish that a strict (and thus stronger) version of the monotonicity condition shown
by Maskin (1999) to be necessary for Nash implementation is necessary under the more stringent
solution concept of rationalizability. Assuming the social choice function is responsive (i.e., it never
picks the same outcome in two distinct states), we show that it is also su¢ cient under a ￿no worst
alternative￿(NWA) condition. In particular, no economic condition is required.
We are able to obtain this strong result because - like much of the classical implementation
literature - we allow in￿nite mechanisms (including ￿integer games￿ ); and - unlike the classical
implementation literature - we allow for stochastic mechanisms.
In earlier work (Bergemann and Morris (2008), (2009)), two of us established necessary and
su¢ cient conditions for ￿robust implementation￿in incomplete information environments. There
we showed that a social choice function f can be Bayesian equilibrium implemented for all possible
beliefs and higher order beliefs if and only if f is implementable under an incomplete information
version of rationalizability. The results here are obtained by re￿ning and further developing the
rationalizability arguments for the complete information environment. We can establish stronger
necessary and su¢ cient conditions than in the incomplete information environment. We can also
dispense with an economic condition on the environment. In turn, we establish necessary con-
ditions and su¢ cient conditions almost equivalent to Nash equilibrium implementation when the
social choice function is responsive. The augmented mechanism which establishes the su¢ ciency
result permits each agent to propose a menu of allocations. This construction already appeared in
Maskin (1999) and Maskin and Sjostrom (2004) to establish complete information implementation
in the presence of mixed strategies. The su¢ ciency arguments for Nash equilibrium implementa-
tion typically rely on a no-veto property of the social choice function. In contrast, we use a weak
condition, introduced as ￿no worst alternative￿by Cabrales and Serrano (2008), to establish the
su¢ ciency argument. This condition requires that in state ￿ and for every agent i, the social choice
f (￿) is not the worst alternative among all possible allocations. The no worst alternative property
plays a role in our proof that is quite distinct from the no veto property in the classic Nash equilib-
rium results. The no worst alternative property guarantees that in the augmented mechanism, any
2report in state ￿ in which an agent expresses his disagreement with the remaining agents cannot
be a rationalizable report. By contrast, the no veto property guaranteed that if an agent were
to express his disagreement, then further disagreement by other agents would only be possible in
equilibrium if it would lead to the same equilibrium allocation as prescribed by f (￿).
These results narrow an open question in the literature. The existing literature shows that
Maskin monotonicity is necessary for Nash implementation in any mechanism (even if stochastic
mechanisms are allowed1). Abreu and Matsushima (1992) shows that if implementation is made
easier by (i) requiring only virtual implementation; and (ii) imposing a weak domain restriction
ruling out identical preferences; then implementation is always possible even if it is made harder by
(iii) requiring ￿nite mechanisms; and (iv) requiring the stronger solution concept of rationalizability.
Our result shows that it is possible to exactly implement a social choice function, in rationalizable
strategies, even if domain restriction (ii) fails, as long as in￿nite, stochastic, mechanisms are allowed.
2 Setup
The environment consists of a collection of I agents (we write I for the set of agents); a ￿nite
set of possible states ￿; a countable set of pure allocations Z (we write Y ￿ ￿(Z) for the set
of lotteries on Z); and, to each state, we associate for each player i a von Neumann-Morgenstern





Thus at two distinct states ￿ and ￿0, all agents can have the same ordinal preferences; this contrasts
with some of the literature that associates a state with a pro￿le of ordinal preferences (e.g. Maskin






, where each Mi is countable, M =
M1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ MI and g : M ! Y .
The environment and the mechanism together describe a game of complete information for each
￿ 2 ￿. We will use (correlated) rationalizability as a solution concept.2 Our formal de￿nition will
coincide with the standard de￿nition with ￿nite or compact message spaces. But we will also allow
in￿nite, non-compact, message spaces; in this case, our de￿nition is equivalent to one introduced
1In such a case, Maskin monotonicity (that is usually de￿ned on the set of pure allocations) has to be stated on
the set of lotteries on pure allocations.
2The original de￿nition of rationalizability of Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) required agents￿conjectures over
their opponents￿play to be independent. We follow the convention of some of the recent literature (e.g., Osborne
and Rubinstein (1994)) in using ￿rationalizability￿for the correlated version of rationalizability (see Brandenburger
and Dekel (1987) for an early de￿nition and discussion). Our results do not rely on the use of the correlated version
of rationalizability.
3in Lipman (1994). Let a message set pro￿le S = (S1;:::;SI), where each Si 2 2Mi, and we write S
for the collection of message set pro￿les. The collection S is a lattice with the natural ordering of
set inclusion: S ￿ S0 if Si ￿ S0
i for all i. The largest element is S = (M1;:::;MI). The smallest
element is S = (?;?;:::;?).
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there exists ￿i 2 ￿(M￿i) such that
(1) ￿i (m￿i) > 0 ) mj 2 Sj for each j 6= i;
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We observe that b￿ is increasing by de￿nition: i.e., S ￿ S0 ) b￿ (S) ￿ b￿ (S0). By Tarski￿ s ￿xed
point theorem, there is a largest ￿xed point of b￿, which we label SM;￿. Thus (i) b￿ ￿
SM;￿￿
= SM;￿
and (ii) b￿ (S) = S ) S ￿ SM;￿. If mi 2 S
M;￿
i , we say that message mi is rationalizable in (the
complete information game parameterized by) state ￿.
We can also construct the ￿xed point SM;￿ by starting with S - the largest element of the lattice














In this case, the solution concept is equivalent to iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies
(see Brandenburger and Dekel (1987)). But if the mechanism M is in￿nite, trans￿nite induction












again using trans￿nite induction if necessary. Thus S
M;￿
i is the set of messages surviving (trans-
￿nite) iterated deletion of never best responses. It is possible to show formally that S
M;￿
i is the
set of messages that agent i might send consistent with common certainty of rationality and the
fact that payo⁄s are given by ￿ (Lipman (1994)). Finally, we will say that a message set pro￿le
S = (S1;:::;SI) has the best response property in state ￿ if S ￿ b￿(S), or equivalently, if for each
player i and message mi 2 Si; there exists ￿i 2 ￿(M￿i) such that ￿i (m￿i) > 0 ) mj 2 Sj for
















3Lipman (1994) contains a formal description of the trans￿nite induction required. As he notes ￿we remove
strategies which are never a best reply, taking limits where needed￿ .
4It is easy to check that if S has the best response property in state ￿, then S ￿ SM;￿.
Now a social choice function (SCF) f is given by f : ￿ ! Y . Mechanism M implements f in
rationalizable strategies if there exists M such that, for all ￿, SM;￿ 6= ? and m 2 SM;￿ ) g (m) =
f (￿). SCF f is implementable in rationalizable strategies if there exists M such that M implements
f in rationalizable strategies. The de￿nition of rationalizable implementation does not require the
existence of a (pure or mixed) Nash equilibrium that leads the realization of the social choice
function f. Hence, a priori, rationalizable implementation need not be stronger (neither weaker)
than Nash implementation. However, in the next Section, we provide necessary conditions and
su¢ cient conditions for rationalizable implementation almost equivalent to Nash implementation.
3 Main Result
We ￿rst recall the de￿nition of Maskin monotonicity restricted to social choice functions:
De￿nition 1 (Maskin Monotonicity)
Social choice function f satis￿es Maskin monotonicity if










for all i and y;
or, equivalently,










for some i and y.
The latter condition states that in case the desired alternative di⁄ers at state ￿ and ￿0, there
must exist at least one agent who, if the true state were ￿0 and she expected other agents to claim
the state is ￿, could be o⁄ered a reward y that would give her a strict incentive to ￿report￿the
deviation of other agents, where the reward y would not tempt her if the true state was in fact
￿ i.e. she would have a (weak) incentive to ￿report truthfully￿ . The strengthening of Maskin
monotonicity we will use, reinforces the latter statement, requiring that the reward y gives a strict
incentive to ￿report truthfully￿if the true state were ￿.
5De￿nition 2 (Strict Maskin Monotonicity)
Social choice function f satis￿es strict Maskin monotonicity if










for all i and y; (1)
or, equivalently,










for some i and y. (2)
Maskin monotonicity, which is necessary for Nash implementation, is weaker than strict Maskin
monotonicity. We show in the following proposition that strict Maskin monotonicity (and hence
Maskin monotonicity) is necessary for rationalizable implementation.
Proposition 1 (Necessary Conditions)
If f is implementable in rationalizable strategies, then f satis￿es strict Maskin monotonicity.
Proposition 1 is a consequence of the following Lemma. In words, it states that, given a social
choice function f, if ￿ and ￿0 satisfy condition (1) in the de￿nition of strict Maskin monotonicity
and, in addition, f is implementable by a mechanism M, then the set of rationalizable message
pro￿les must be the same in state ￿ and ￿0.
Lemma 1






implements f in rational-
izable strategies, then we have SM;￿ = SM;￿0
.







implements f in rationalizable strategies.
We ￿rst show that SM;￿ ￿ SM;￿0
. Because b￿ ￿
SM;￿￿
= SM;￿, SM;￿ has the best response
property in state ￿ (i.e., for each player i and all mi 2 S
M;￿
i , there exists ￿
mi;￿
i 2 ￿(M￿i) such
that ￿
mi;￿
i (m￿i) > 0 ) mj 2 S
M;￿













i 2 Mi. We want to show that mi is also a best response against ￿
mi;￿
i in state ￿0.
Since i and mi 2 S
M;￿
i have been ￿xed arbitrarily, this will prove that SM;￿ has the best response
6property in state ￿0 and so that SM;￿ ￿ SM;￿0
as claimed. Note ￿rst that for any m￿i such that
￿
mi;￿
i (m￿i) > 0; m￿i 2 S
M;￿
￿i and so because mi 2 S
M;￿




























i = 2 S
M;￿
i . By (3), the above is true with a weak inequality. Now if an equality were to hold,
some m0
i = 2 S
M;￿
i would be a best response against ￿
mi;￿






have the best response property in state ￿ implying that m0
i 2 S
M;￿
i which is false by assumption.
Now we know that
ui(f(￿);￿) > ui(y;￿) ) ui(f(￿);￿0) ￿ ui(y;￿0) for all i and y;



















i = 2 S
M;￿




Now, let us show that SM;￿ ￿ SM;￿0
. Since f is implementable in rationalizable strategies by
M and SM;￿ ￿ SM;￿0
, we have f (￿) = f
￿
￿0￿
. Take any player i and any m￿
i 2 S
M;￿0








i 2 ￿(M￿i) satisfying ￿
mi;￿
i (m￿i) > 0 ) mj 2 S
M;￿
j for
all j 6= i; and





















i 2 Mi. Note that since SM;￿ ￿ SM;￿0
, we have that ￿
mi;￿
i (m￿i) > 0 ) mj 2 S
M;￿0
j for
all j 6= i; in addition, m￿
i 2 S
M;￿0
i and so g (m￿
i;m￿i) = f(￿0) = f(￿) for any m￿i such that
￿
mi;￿





i (m￿i)ui (g (m￿





i (m￿i)ui (g (mi;m￿i);￿); (7)
and thus (6) and (7) together show that m￿
i is a best response against ￿
mi;￿




i , as claimed.
7It is clear that Proposition 1 is obtained as a corollary of Lemma 1.
Oury and Tercieux (2009) have shown that Maskin monotonicity is a necessary condition for
￿continuous￿partial implementation of a social choice function, where ￿continuous￿means that
the direct mechanism itself must work for types that are close to the complete information types
in the product topology. They also show that full implementation in rationalizable strategies is
necessary. Hence, an alternative way to prove the necessity of Maskin monotonicity would be to
use this latter result and Proposition 1.
We need two extra conditions for the su¢ ciency result.
De￿nition 3 (Responsive Social Choice Function)
Social choice function f is responsive if ￿ 6= ￿0 ) f(￿) 6= f(￿0).
The notion of responsiveness requires that the social choice function ￿responds￿to a change in
the state with a change in the social allocation.
De￿nition 4 (No Worst Alternative)
Social choice function f satis￿es ￿no worst alternative￿ (NWA) if, for each i and ￿, there exists
y
i (￿) such that






Property NWA requires that an agent never gets his worst outcome under the social choice
function. The NWA property appears in Cabrales and Serrano (2008) as a su¢ cient condition to
guarantee implementation in best-response dynamics. Given the set of allocations fy
i (￿)g￿2￿, we
de￿ne the average allocation y









Note that under NWA, for all ￿ and all i, there exists yi(￿) such that
ui(yi(￿);￿) > ui(y
i;￿); (10)




















8Here again, we note that under NWA, for all ￿ and all i, there exists y￿
i (￿) such that
ui(y￿
i (￿);￿) > ui(y;￿); (11)
where the above inequality clearly holds after de￿ning y￿












We now construct an auxiliary set of allocations, denoted by fzi
￿
￿;￿0￿
g￿;￿0, which uses the existence
of the allocations fy
i (￿)g￿2￿. The allocations fzi
￿
￿;￿0￿
g￿;￿0 are going to appear in the canonical
mechanism to be de￿ned shortly where they guarantee the existence of better response for agent i
should the remaining agents choose to misreport the true state. In particular, the following Lemma
establishes that for agent i the allocation zi
￿
￿;￿0￿
represents an improvement if the true state is ￿
but the other agents misreport it to be ￿0. It also establishes that zi
￿
￿;￿0￿
would not constitute an
improvement relative to f
￿
￿0￿
if the true state were indeed ￿0.
Lemma 2
If social choice function f satis￿es ￿no worst alternative￿ (NWA) then for each player i, there



































Proof. Based on the allocations fy
i (￿)g￿2￿ from De￿nition 4, we de￿ne our collection of



























i(^ ￿) + f (￿)
1
A:
By NWA and the ￿niteness of the state space ￿, we can ￿nd a su¢ ciently small, but positive, " > 0












which establishes inequality (12). Now






is the fact that the lottery y
i (￿)
9is replaced by the lottery f (￿). But now by NWA, this is clearly increasing the expected utility of
















which establishes the strict inequality (13).
We establish the su¢ cient conditions for implementation in rationalizable strategies by means
of a canonical mechanism. The canonical mechanism shares many basic features with the imple-
mentation mechanism suggested by Maskin and Sjostrom (2004) to establish complete information
implementation in the presence of mixed strategies, and is a modi￿cation of the original mechanism





￿;￿0 appear in the mech-
anism if agent i reports a state ￿ di⁄erent from the reported state ￿0 by all the other agents. In
this case, the allocation zi
￿
￿0;￿0￿
is chosen with positive probability, yet this probability can be




In the Proposition below, we show that Maskin monotonicity together with NWA are su¢ cient
for rationalizable implementation. The fact that we do not refer to strict Maskin monotonicity
in this statement may seem surprising given that in Proposition 1 we showed that strict Maskin
monotonicity is a necessary condition for rationalizable implementation. This is due to the simple
fact that under NWA, strict Maskin monotonicity and Maskin monotonicity are equivalent.4
Proposition 2 (Su¢ cient Conditions)
If I ￿ 3, f is responsive, satis￿es Maskin monotonicity and NWA, then f is implementable in
rationalizable strategies.
Proof. We establish the result by constructing an implementing mechanism M = (M;g).

































i;￿;￿0 has been de￿ned in Lemma 2 while the collection fy￿
i (￿)gi;￿
has been established in (11).
4To see this just note that if f is Maskin monotonic then f(￿) 6= f(￿
0) implies the existence of some i and
y satisfying ui (f (￿);￿) ￿ ui (y;￿) and ui (y;￿
0) > ui (f (￿);￿
0). Now, under NWA, there exists y
i (￿) such that





. Now if one sets ~ y = "y
i (￿) + (1 ￿ ")y, for " small enough we get ui (f (￿);￿) > ui (~ y;￿)
and ui (y;￿
0) > ui (f (￿);￿
0), showing that f is strict Maskin monotonic.









i 2 ￿, m2
i 2 Z+, m3
i : ￿ !
Y;m4
i 2 Y. The third component of the message pro￿le will allow agent i to suggest an allocation
m3
i (￿) contingent on all the other agents j 6= i reporting m1
j = ￿. The outcome function will make
use of the ￿uniformly worse outcome￿de￿ned earlier by y. Now the outcome g (m) is determined
by the following rules:
Rule 1: If m1
i = ￿ and m2
i = 1 for all i, pick f (￿).













6= (￿;1), then we go to two subrules:






i (￿) with probability 1 ￿ 1=(m2
i + 1) and zi (￿;￿) with
probability 1=(m2
i + 1);





, pick zi (￿;￿) with probability 1.
Rule 3: In all other cases, we identify a pivotal agent i by requiring that m2
i ￿ m2
j for all j 2 I and
that if for j 6= i; m2
i = m2
j, then i < j. The rule then requires that with probability 1￿1=(m2
i +1)
we pick m4
i, and with probability 1=(m2
i + 1) we pick y.
Claim 1. It is never a best reply for agent i to send a message with m2




















i > 1. Then for any pro￿le of messages m￿i that player i￿ s opponents may play, (mi;m￿i)
will trigger either Rule 2 or Rule 3. But in this case, whatever agent i￿ s beliefs ￿i 2 ￿(M￿i)
about the other agents￿messages, his payo⁄ can be increased by modifying mi appropriately, in
particular by increasing the integer choice from m2
i. To see this, denote the set of messages of all







j = ￿0 and m2
j = 1 for some ￿0 for all j 6= i
￿
; (14)
and the set of messages of all agents excluding i in which Rule 3 is triggered as the complement
set:
M3
￿i , M￿i n M2
￿i: (15)
Suppose ￿rst that agent i has a belief ￿i 2 ￿(M￿i) under which Rule 3 is triggered with positive





> 0. Note that if agent i plays mi; with strictly positive probability
y is provided. Hence, because from (11), y￿
i (￿) 2 Y is such that ui(y￿
i (￿);￿) > ui(y;￿), i￿ s expected















i) where b m4
i 2 argmaxy2Y ui(y;￿), it is easily checked








i tends to in￿nity. Thus, player i can always improve his expected payo⁄ conditional on Rule
3 by deviating from mi to b mi and announcing b m2
i large enough.










i) and observe that the
choice of b m4
i does not a⁄ect the outcome of the mechanism conditional on Rule 2. We also note
that for any m￿i 2 M2
￿i such that ￿i (m￿i) > 0, (mi;m￿i) does not trigger Rule 2(ii). Indeed, if
it were the case, we would have ui(g(mi;m￿i);￿) = ui(zi(m1
￿i;m1
￿i);￿). We have to distinguish
two cases: whether players j 6= i send message ￿ or not. First, consider the case where m1
￿i 6= ￿.5
Now, player i could change mi to b mi having b m3
i(m1
￿i) = zi(￿;m1
￿i) and keeping mi unchanged























, and so by
construction of the mechanism, (b mi;m￿i) now triggers Rule 2(i). Again using Lemma 2 and the
fact that m1

















￿i);￿) = ui(g(b mi;m￿i);￿):
Hence, the expected utility of player i would strictly increase, which yields the contradiction.
Consider the second case where m1
￿i = ￿, player i could change mi to b mi having b mi(m1
￿i) = f(￿)
and keeping mi unchanged otherwise. It is clear that by construction of the mechanism, (b mi;m￿i)














ui(zi (￿;￿);￿) = ui(g(b mi;m￿i);￿);
the expected utility of player i would strictly increase, which here again yields a contradiction. So
now we know that for any m￿i 2 M2
￿i such that ￿i (m￿i) > 0, (mi;m￿i) does not trigger Rule 2
(ii). Using a similar reasoning, it is easily shown that for any m￿i 2 M2
￿i such that ￿i (m￿i) > 0,




￿i);￿); hence the expected payo⁄ conditional on Rule
















5We sometimes abuse notations and write m
1
￿i = ￿ whenever m
1
j = ￿ for all j 6= i.
12is strictly increasing in m2
i. It follows that the choice of b mi with b m2
i large and strictly larger than m2
i










i for all i, ￿, m3
i, m4
i.
Proof of Claim 2. Suppose that player i in state ￿ puts probability 1 on each other agent j sending
a message of the form (￿;1;m3
j;m4







he gets payo⁄ ui (f (￿);￿). If he announces a message not of this form, the outcome is determined
by Rule 2. Since by Lemma 2, ui(zi(￿;￿);￿) < ui(f(￿);￿), it is clear that by construction of the
mechanism, his payo⁄ from invoking Rule 2 is bounded above by ui (f (￿);￿).








i , then ￿0 = ￿.








i . Given the message mi, we can de￿ne the
set of messages of the remaining agents which trigger Rule 1, 2 or 3, respectively. In particular, we
de￿ne M1
￿i as the set of m￿i 2 M￿i such that (mi;m￿i) triggers Rule 1. Similarly, M
2;i
￿i is de￿ned
as the set of m￿i 2 M￿i such that (mi;m￿i) triggers Rule 2 where player i is the deviating player.





= 0, then Rule 2 or 3 will be
triggered with probability one. Although, Rule 2 can now be triggered with a ￿deviating player￿
being di⁄erent of i, it is easily checked that a similar argument as in Claim 1 applies and so the








While we still argue that agent i can strictly increase his expected utility by selecting an integer
b m2
i > 1, we observe that a complication arises as with ￿i given by (16), a choice of b m2
i > 1 leads
from an allocation determined by Rule 1 to an allocation determined by Rule 2, and hence the
realization of an unfavorable allocation y with positive probability. But now we observe that by





















i 2 argmaxy2Y ui(y;￿) and by choosing an integer b m2
i su¢ ciently large, the small loss in Rule 2
can always be o⁄set by a gain in Rule 3 relative to the allocation achieved under g (mi;m￿i). More











< 1 and since ￿as claimed before ￿
for all m￿i 2 M
2;i




￿i);￿), i￿ s expected payo⁄




















13while for b mi = (￿0; b m2
i; b m3
i; b m4
i); it is easily checked that as b m2
i tends to in￿nity, i￿ s expected payo⁄s
tend toward the expression above. Hence, choosing b m2
i large enough, b mi is a better response against
￿i for player i than mi, a contradiction.








i , it follows player i must be convinced that each other player




















j for all j. Now, proceed by





















. By the above argument,






is a best reply assigns probability






. Hence, player j￿ s






















player j believes with probability one that Rule 2(i) will be triggered. Hence, player j￿ s expected
payo⁄ would be
￿
1 ￿ 1=(b m2
j + 1)
￿
uj(y(￿0;￿);￿) + (1=(b m2
j + 1))uj(zj(￿0;￿0);￿):
Note that as ^ m2








. Hence for ^ m2







a contradiction. Thus f
￿
￿0￿
= f (￿). Since the social choice function has been assumed to be
responsive, we get ￿0 = ￿ as claimed.
Completion of proof. Claims 1, 2 and 3 together imply that for each ￿ : S
M;￿




i = 1 and m1
i = ￿. Thus SM;￿ 6= ? and m 2 SM;￿ ) g (m) = f (￿).








i gives agent i the opportunity to select an appropriate allocation in case that Rule 2
is triggered. In our su¢ ciency argument, the NWA property replaces the no veto property which
commonly appears in the su¢ ciency argument for implementation in Nash equilibrium. Yet, in
terms of the proof, the role of the NWA property is quite distinct from the no veto property. The
NWA property guarantees that in the augmented mechanism, any report in state ￿ in which an
agent expresses his disagreement with the remaining agents (i.e. m2
i > 1) cannot be a rational-
izable report. By contrast, the no veto property guaranteed that if an agent were to express his
disagreement, then further disagreement by other agents would only be possible in equilibrium if
it would lead to the same equilibrium allocation as prescribed f (￿).
14We note that our mechanism not only implements in rationalizable messages but also implements
in Nash equilibrium (the proof of Claim 2 above indeed establishes the existence of a pure Nash
equilibrium at each state). In recent work, Bochet (2007) and Benoit and Ok (2008) report su¢ cient
conditions for implementation in Nash equilibrium strategies using stochastic mechanisms. Their
conditions, the top strict di⁄erence condition and the top coincidence condition, respectively, do
not imply nor are they implied by the NWA property required for su¢ ciency. In related work,
Serrano and Vohra (2007) have used stochastic implementing mechanisms to provide weak su¢ cient
conditions for Bayesian implementation in mixed strategy Bayes Nash equilibrium.
4 The Non-Responsive Case
In this section, we discuss extensions of our results to the cases when the social choice function is
not responsive. We will provide a strengthening of strict Maskin monotonicity that can be shown
to be su¢ cient (together with a strengthening of the NWA) even if the social choice function is
not responsive. We also show that the strengthening of strict Maskin monotonicity is actually
necessary for rationalizable implementation given a weak condition on the class of mechanisms to
be considered. This weak condition is trivially satis￿ed when the social choice function is responsive.
Now, given a social choice function f, let us consider the unique partition of ￿ : Pf = f￿zgz2f(￿)
such that
￿z = f￿ 2 ￿jf (￿) = zg. (17)
We now introduce the following notion which reduces to strict Maskin monotonicity in case f is
responsive.
De￿nition 5 (Strict Maskin Monotonicity￿)
Social choice function f satis￿es strict Maskin monotonicity￿ if there exists a partition P of ￿ ￿ner
than Pf s.t. for any ￿ :
1. ￿0 2 P(￿) whenever for all i and y
h

































for all b ￿ 2 P(￿). (19)
15Before we establish the necessary and su¢ cient conditions, we brie￿ y describe the complications
that arise with a non-responsive social choice function. By de￿nition, under a non-responsive
social choice function there are at least two states, ￿ and ￿0, that lead to the same social choice:
f (￿) = f
￿
￿0￿
= z. Now, a priori, the principal would not need to know whether it is the state ￿
or ￿0 which leads to the realization of the social choice z. In fact, it would appear that it would
be su¢ cient to learn that the realized state belongs to the set ￿z of states which lead to the social
choice z. Now, such a coarse reporting protocol as suggested by the above partition Pf would
be su¢ cient if the agents were known to report truthfully, yet a problem arises if they might
not report truthfully. For, if an agent now alleges collusive behavior of the remaining agents, the
principal may lack the information to verify whether the whistle-blower himself is behaving in an
incentive compatible manner. After all, the principal would merely know that the reported state
is in some set ￿z but would not know the identity of the state itself. Thus, while it might not be
useful to distinguish between any two states ￿;￿0 2 ￿z if the agents were to report truthfully, it
might be critical to distinguish between ￿ and ￿0 in order to fend o⁄ undesirable equilibrium play
by the agents. This discussion might therefore suggest that the inequalities (18), or alternatively
(19), should be satis￿ed for the ￿nest possible partition of states. But, as we argue next, such a
condition would (i) require too much to constitute a necessary condition, and (ii) be impossible to
satisfy by any implementing mechanism.
The ￿rst observation is straightforward to establish. Consider for the moment the strict Maskin
monotonicity￿ condition in the version of (19), which we might refer to as the whistle-blower
inequality. Now suppose that the social choice problem is such that the inequalities (19) are
satis￿ed even for the coarse partition Pf itself. In this case, we would ￿nd that the principal would
not need to distinguish between any two states ￿;￿0 2 ￿z, either for truthtelling or, by condition
(19), for whistle-blowing behavior.
The second observation stems from an earlier result. Lemma 1 gave a su¢ cient condition under
which the set of rationalizable actions for any pair of states, ￿ and ￿0, have to be identical for all
agents. For the purpose here we can restrict attention to any two states with ￿;￿0 2 ￿z. In this
case, the condition (1) reads as follows:






for all i and y.




at one state, say ￿0, is included in the upper contour set of the other state, say ￿, then the sets of
rationalizable actions have to coincide. But of course, once the sets of rationalizable actions have
to agree, it will be impossible to distinguish behavior in state ￿ from behavior in state ￿0. The
inclusion property of the upper contour sets, given by condition (1), thus imposes an upper bound
16on how ￿ne the partition P can be chosen while remaining compatible with rationalizable behavior.
We ￿nally observe that the partition P may yet have to be coarser than is indicated by the pairwise
inclusion property. To see this, consider ￿;￿0;￿00 2 ￿z, and suppose that the upper contour sets
(relative to the allocation z) in state ￿0 as well as in state ￿00 are included in the upper contour
sets in state ￿, but that the upper contour sets in the state ￿0 and ￿00 themselves do not display an
inclusive relationship. Now, Lemma 1 tells us that SM;￿ = SM;￿0
and that SM;￿ = SM;￿00
which of
course implies that SM;￿0
= SM;￿00
even though the condition (1) does not apply to the states ￿0
and ￿00 themselves.
As we already stated, we can prove that strict Maskin monotonicity￿ is necessary under a weak
condition on the class of mechanisms we consider. This condition states that for any state ￿ and
any rationalizable message mi of any player i in this state, the message mi is also best-response to
some belief with support in the set of rationalizable actions of the other players and for any state
b ￿ such that SM;b ￿ = SM;￿, best responses against this belief are non-empty.
De￿nition 6 (Best Response Property)
Given a social choice function f, a mechanism M has the best-response property if for all ￿ and
all mi 2 S
M;￿
i , there exists ￿
mi;￿
i 2 ￿(M￿i) satisfying ￿
mi;￿
i (m￿i) > 0 ) mj 2 S
M;￿
j for each
j 6= i; and such that mi is a best response against ￿
mi;￿









i;m￿i);b ￿) 6= ;
for all b ￿ such that SM;b ￿ = SM;￿.
Note that if f is responsive then any implementing mechanism must satisfy SM;b ￿ = SM;￿ )
b ￿ = ￿ and so any implementing mechanism must have the best-response property. Moreover, the
best-response property also holds for any pair ￿;￿0 which are directly related through the inclusion
property (1). The best-response property then secures that it applies also to pro￿les which are
indirectly related as in the example of ￿;￿0;￿00 2 ￿z discussed above. Hence, the subsequent
Proposition 3 generalizes Proposition 1 above.
Proposition 3 (Necessary Conditions)
If f is implementable in rationalizable strategies by a mechanism M having the best-response prop-
erty, then f satis￿es strict Maskin monotonicity￿.
In order to show this, we prove the following Lemma that generalizes Lemma 1.
17Lemma 3






, that has the best-response property and
that implements f in rationalizable strategies. Pick ￿ and ￿0 satisfying condition (18) where the
partition P is assumed to be P(￿00) =
n





for any ￿00. We have SM;￿ = SM;￿0
.






that has the best-response property and that
implements f and pick ￿ and ￿0 satisfying condition (18) for P(￿00) =
n






for all i and y
h

















Note that by construction, b ￿ 2 P(￿) ) SM;b ￿ = SM;￿. In addition, since M implements f in
rationalizable strategies, for any state in P(￿00), f picks the outcome f(￿00) and so P is ￿ner than
Pf.
We ￿rst show that SM;￿ ￿ SM;￿0
. Because b￿ ￿
SM;￿￿
= SM;￿, SM;￿ has the best response
property in state ￿ i.e. for all player i and all mi 2 S
M;￿
i ; there exists ￿
mi;￿
i 2 ￿(M￿i) such that
￿
mi;￿
i (m￿i) > 0 ) mj 2 S
M;￿













i 2 Mi. In addition, since M has the best response property, ￿
mi;￿









i;m￿i);b ￿) 6= ;;
























i (m￿i)ui(g(mi;m￿i);b ￿) = ui(f(￿);b ￿)
where m￿
i denotes a best response to ￿
mi;￿
i in state b ￿ and so g(m￿
i;m￿i) 6= f(￿) for some (m￿
i;m￿i) 2







Now, we want to show that mi is also a best response against ￿
mi;￿
i in state ￿0. Since i and
mi 2 S
M;￿
i have been ￿xed arbitrarily, this will prove that SM;￿ has the best response property in
18state ￿0 and so that SM;￿ ￿ SM;￿0
as claimed. Note ￿rst that for any m￿i such that ￿
mi;￿
i (m￿i) > 0;
m￿i 2 S
M;￿
￿i and so because mi 2 S
M;￿




























i = 2 S
M;￿
i . Indeed, by (20), the above is true with a weak inequality. Now if an equality
were to hold, some m0
i = 2 S
M;￿
i would be a best response against ￿
mi;￿

















￿i would have the best response property in state





i which is false by assumption.
Now, by assumption, we know that
h
















for all i and y



















i = 2 S
M;￿
i . Finally, (21) and (23) ensure that mi is also a best response against ￿
mi;￿
i in
state ￿0. Hence, SM;￿ ￿ SM;￿0
as claimed.
To complete the proof, we have to show that SM;￿ ￿ SM;￿0
. The argument is the same as in
Lemma 1.
Note that if f is implementable by a mechanism M that has the best response property, then
if one were to pick the partition P given by P(￿00) =
n





for any ￿00, then
whenever ￿ and ￿0 satisfy condition (18), by Lemma 3, we must have SM;￿ = SM;￿0
and so, by
de￿nition, ￿0 2 P(￿). Hence, Proposition 3 is obtained as a corollary of Lemma 3.
As mentioned earlier, it is easily checked that our su¢ ciency argument can be extended to this
setting provided that a strengthening of NWA is used. To be more speci￿c, if one assumes that f
is (strict) Maskin monotonic and that for any state ￿, there exists some outcome that is worse than
the outcome selected by f at any state in the partition cell P(￿), then we can build a mechanism
similar to the one built in the proof of Proposition 2.6 In the revised mechanism each player is
6As for Proposition 2, the proof would go through if we just considered Maskin monotonicity
￿ instead of strict
Maskin monotonicity
￿.
19asked to report a partition cell P in P, an integer, a mapping from P to Y and a lottery in Y.
Essentially, everything would go as if we were replacing each state ￿ by the partition cell containing
￿. In particular, as in the responsive case, we can show that for any rationalizable message, using
condition (19) in the de￿nition of Maskin monotonicity￿, each agent will report truthfully, i.e., will
report P(￿) whenever the true state is ￿ and announce an integer equal to 1. The modi￿ed notions
of strict Maskin monotonicity and NWA as well as the su¢ ciency argument itself are presented in
detail in the appendix.
5 Concluding Remarks
We conclude with a few observations. First, this paper focused on social choice functions, let us
brie￿ y discuss the case of social choice correspondences. In Proposition 1 and 2 we reported results
for social choice functions only. A social choice correspondence de￿nes a set of permissible alloca-
tions and rationalizability is a set-based solution concept. Thus, there are a number of plausible
extensions of the de￿nition of rationalizable implementation to social choice correspondences. The
extensions basically vary to the extent that one wishes to restrict attention to selections in the
set of outcome pro￿les.7 We now show that Maskin monotonicity may not even be a necessary
condition for implementation in rationalizable strategies (according to at least one natural de￿ni-
tion of these terms).8 We describe the di¢ culty of social choice correspondences with the following
approach (and subsequent example). A (pure outcome) social choice correspondence (SCC) is a
mapping F : ￿ ! 2Z￿
?. A social choice correspondence F is implementable in rationalizable
strategies if there exists a mechanism M with g
￿
SM;￿￿
= F (￿) for all ￿ 2 ￿. A SCC F is Maskin






for all i and
z; then z￿ 2 F
￿
￿0￿
. Note that this de￿nition is given in terms of pure outcomes. Now consider
the following example. There are 2 agents; ￿ = f￿;￿g; Z = fa;b;c;dg; payo⁄s are given by the
following table:
u(￿;￿) a b c d
￿ 1 + ";0 0;1 + " 1;1 1 + 2";1 + 2"
￿ 1 + ";0 0;" 1;1 1 + 2";1 + 2"
The social choice correspondence is F￿ (￿) = fa;b;c;dg and F￿ (￿) = fdg. Now we demonstrate
that F￿ is not Maskin monotonic. To see why, note that a 2 F￿ (￿) and that ui (a;￿) ￿ ui (z;￿) )
7The issue already appears in incomplete information implementation literature, where it is common to use a
social choice set, a selection, rather than the social choice correspondence.
8As shown in Mezzetti and Renou (2009), a similar issue appears when one considers implementation in mixed
Nash equilibrium where ￿contrary to the usual requirement ￿implementation does not ask for each alternative in
the set of desired alternatives to be the outcome of a pure Nash equilibrium.
20ui (a;￿) ￿ ui (z;￿) for all i and z. So Maskin monotonicity would require a 2 F￿ (￿). But F￿ is













1 a b c
m2
1 b a c
m3
1 c c d
Now, for each i, S
M;￿
i;k = Mi for all k and thus S
M;￿
i = Mi. Thus g[SM;￿] = fa;b;c;dg = F￿ (￿).




















































and thus g[SM;￿] = fdg = F￿ (￿). We thus showed that F￿ is implementable in rationalizable
strategies, yet did not satisfy Maskin monotonicity.
Second, Proposition 1 exhibits a necessary condition for rationalizable implementation that is
strictly stronger than the usual one for Nash implementation. Here we provide an example of a
social choice function that is not rationalizable implementable but which is Nash-implementable.
There are 3 agents; ￿ = f￿;￿g; Z = fa;b;c;dg; payo⁄s are given by the following table:
u(￿;￿) a b c d
￿ 0;0;0 0;1;0 1;0;0 0;0;1
￿ 0;0;0 1;1;1 0;0;0 0;0;0
The social choice correspondence is f (￿) = a and f (￿) = b. It is easily checked that f is Maskin
monotonic (u1(f (￿);￿) = u1(b;￿) but u1(f (￿);￿) < u1(b;￿); similarly, u1(f (￿);￿) > u1(c;￿)
but u1(f (￿);￿) < u1(c;￿)) and satis￿es no-veto-power. Hence, standard arguments (see Maskin
(1999) and Maskin and Sjostrom (2004)) show that f is implementable in (pure or mixed) Nash
equilibrium. However, for any player i and y 2 ￿(Z) : ui(f (￿);￿) ￿ ui(y;￿) and so this social
choice function cannot be strict Maskin monotonic, and so it is not implementable in rationalizable
strategies.
Finally, from a purely game-theoretic point of view, the results presented in Proposition 1
and 2 may appear surprisingly strong. Given that we are investigating a social choice function,
21the notion of full implementation is akin to requiring that the game has a unique equilibrium
(outcome). The present implementation results then say that ￿provided that the social choice
function is responsive ￿a unique rationalizable outcome arises under (almost) the same conditions
as a unique Nash equilibrium outcome. This is noteworthy as the necessary and almost su¢ cient
condition of Maskin monotonicity is much weaker than the well-known conditions under which
there are close connections between Nash equilibrium and rationalizability, such as supermodular or
concave games. The Nash equilibrium results indicate the strength of the implementation approach
to reduce the number of equilibria. The arguments presented here complement and extend these
results. By using in￿nite message spaces and stochastic allocations, we strengthen the positive
implementation results to the weaker solution concept of rationalizability.
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236 Appendix
In the appendix we provide a proof of our su¢ ciency result for the case that the social choice
function is not responsive. Assume that f satis￿es strict Maskin monotonicity￿ with partition P.
We say that f satis￿es the ￿no worst alternative￿￿ , not only when agents never get their worst
outcome under the social choice function but if for any state ￿, there is some outcome that is worst
than the outcome selected by f at any state in the element P(￿) of the partition P. In the sequel,
we will write [￿] for P(￿) and sometimes abuse notations writing f ([￿]) for f(￿).
De￿nition 7












for each b ￿ 2 [￿].
Given a set of allocations fy
i ([￿])g￿2￿, it is useful to de￿ne the average allocation y










Note that under NWA￿, for all [￿] and all i, there exists a yi([￿]) such that
ui(y(i;[￿]);^ ￿) > ui(y
i;^ ￿); (24)















Here again, we note that under NWA￿, for all [￿] and all i, there exists a y￿(i;[￿]) such that
ui(y￿(i;[￿]);^ ￿) > ui(y;^ ￿); (25)
for all ^ ￿ 2 [￿]. It is indeed easily checked that this is true for y￿










g￿;￿0, which uses the
existence of the allocations fy
i ([￿])g￿2￿. Here is an analogous lemma to Lemma 2.
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for all ^ ￿ 2 [￿0] (26)


















Proof. Based on the allocations fy
i ([￿])g￿2￿, we de￿ne our collection of lotteries as follows.




































By NWA￿ and the ￿niteness of the state space ￿, we can ￿nd a su¢ ciently small, but positive, " > 0















for all ^ ￿ 2 [￿0] which establishes









fact that the lottery y
i ([￿]) is replaced by the lottery f (￿). But now by NWA￿, this is clearly


















which establishes the strict inequality (27).
We are now in a position to prove our su¢ ciency result.
Proposition 4 (Su¢ cient Conditions)
If I ￿ 3 and f satis￿es strict Maskin monotonicity￿ and NWA￿, then f is implementable in
rationalizable strategies.
Proof. We establish the result by constructing an implementing mechanism M = (M;g).
First, recall that by de￿nition of strict Maskin monotonicity￿, for all ￿ and ￿0 such that [￿0] 6=


































i;￿;￿0 has been de￿ned in Lemma 4 while the collection fy￿(i;[￿])gi;￿
has been established in (25).









i 2 P, m2
i 2 Z+, m3
i : P !
Y;m4
i 2 Y. The third component of the message pro￿le will allow agent i to suggest an allocation
m3
i ([￿]) contingent on all the other agents j 6= i reporting m1
j = [￿]. The outcome function
will make use of the ￿uniformly worst outcome￿de￿ned earlier by y. Now the outcome g (m) is
determined by the following rules:
Rule 1: If m1
i = [￿] and m2
i = 1 for all i, pick f (￿).9






= ([￿];1) for all






6= ([￿];1), then we go to two subrules:










i ([￿]) with probability 1 ￿ 1=(m2
i + 1)
and zi ([￿];[￿]) with probability 1=(m2
i + 1);









, pick zi ([￿];[￿]) with probability 1.
Rule 3: In all other cases, we identify a pivotal agent i by requiring that m2
i ￿ m2
j for all j 2 I and
that if for j 6= i; m2
i = m2
j, then i < j. The rule then requires that with probability 1￿1=(m2
i +1)
we pick m4
i, and with probability 1=(m2
i + 1) we pick y.
Claim 1. It is never a best reply for agent i to send a message with m2




















i > 1. Then for any pro￿le of messages m￿i player i￿ s opponents may play, (mi;m￿i) will
trigger either Rule 2 or Rule 3. But in this case, whatever agent i￿ s beliefs ￿i 2 ￿(M￿i) about the
other agents￿messages, his payo⁄ can be increased by modifying mi appropriately, in particular
by increasing the integer choice from m2
i. To see this, denote the set of messages of the remaining






j = [￿0] and m2
j = 1 for some [￿0] for all j 6= i
￿
;
and the set of messages of the remaining agents in which Rule 3 is triggered is the complement set,
de￿ned by:
M3
￿i , M￿i n M2
￿i:
Suppose ￿rst that agent i has a belief ￿i 2 ￿(M￿i) under which Rule 3 is triggered with positive





> 0. Note that if agent i plays mi; with strictly positive probability
y is provided. Hence, because from (25), y￿(i;[￿]) 2 Y is such that ui(y￿(i;[￿]);￿) > ui(y;￿), i￿ s
expected utility conditional on Rule 3 i.e.,
P
m￿i2M3
￿i ￿i (m￿i)ui(g(mi;m￿i);￿); is strictly smaller









i) where b m4
i 2








i tends to in￿nity. Thus, player i can always improve his expected payo⁄ conditional on Rule
3 deviating from mi to b mi and announcing b m2
i large enough.










i) and observe that the
choice of b m4
i does not a⁄ect the outcome of the mechanism conditional on Rule 2. We also note
that for any m￿i 2 M2
￿i such that ￿i (m￿i) > 0, (mi;m￿i) does not trigger Rule 2(ii). Indeed, if it
were the case, we would have ui(g(mi;m￿i);￿) = ui(zi(m1
￿i;m1
￿i);￿). We have to distinguish two
cases: whether players j 6= i send message [￿] or not. First, consider the case where10 m1
￿i 6= [￿],
player i could change mi to b mi having b m3
i(m1
￿i) = zi([￿];m1
￿i) and keeping mi unchanged otherwise.




















for all b ￿ 2 m1
￿i, and so by
construction of the mechanism, (b mi;m￿i) now triggers Rule 2(i). Again using Lemma 4 and the
fact that m1

















￿i);￿) = ui(g(b mi;m￿i);￿):
Hence, the expected utility of player i would strictly increase, which yields contradiction. Consider
the second case where m1
￿i = [￿], player i could change mi to b mi having b mi(m1
￿i) = f(￿) and keeping
mi unchanged otherwise. It is clear that by construction of the mechanism, (b mi;m￿i) now triggers














ui(zi ([￿];[￿]);￿) = ui(g(b mi;m￿i);￿)
the expected utility of player i would strictly increase, which here again yields a contradiction. So
now we know that for any m￿i 2 M2
￿i such that ￿i (m￿i) > 0, (mi;m￿i) does not trigger Rule
2(ii). Using a similar reasoning, it is easily shown that for any m￿i 2 M2
￿i such that ￿i (m￿i) > 0,























j = [￿] for all j 6= i, we sometimes abuse notations and write m
1
￿i = [￿].
27is strictly increasing in m2
i. It follows that the choice of b mi with b m2
i large and strictly larger than m2
i










i for all i, ￿, m3
i, m4
i.
Proof of Claim 2. Suppose that player i in state ￿ puts probability 1 on each other agent j sending
a message of the form ([￿];1;m3
j;m4







he gets payo⁄ ui (f (￿);￿). If he announces a message not of this form, the outcome is determined
by Rule 2. Since by Lemma 4, ui(zi([￿];[￿]);￿) < ui(f(￿);￿), it is clear that by construction of the
mechanism, his payo⁄ from invoking Rule 2 is bounded above by ui (f (￿);￿).








i , then [￿0] = [￿].








i . Given the message mi, we can de￿ne
the set of messages of the remaining agents which trigger Rule 1, 2 or 3, respectively. In particular,
we de￿ne M1
￿i for the set of m￿i 2 M￿i such that (mi;m￿i) triggers Rule 1. Similarly, M
2;i
￿i is
de￿ned as the set of m￿i 2 M￿i such that (mi;m￿i) triggers Rule 2 where player i is the deviating





= 0, then Rule 2 or
3 will be triggered with probability one. Although, Rule 2 can now be triggered with a "deviating
player" being di⁄erent of i, it is easily checked that a similar argument as in Claim 1 applies and








While we still argue that agent i can strictly increase his expected utility by selecting an integer
b m2
i > 1, we observe that a complication arises as with ￿i given by (28), a choice of b m2
i > 1 leads
from an allocation determined by Rule 1 to an allocation determined by Rule 2, and hence the
realization of an unfavorable allocation y with positive probability. But now we observe that by





















i 2 argmaxy2Y ui(y;￿) and by choosing an integer b m2
i su¢ ciently large, the small loss in Rule 2
can always be o⁄set by a gain in Rule 3 relative to the allocation achieved under g (mi;m￿i). More











< 1 and since ￿as claimed before
￿for all m￿i 2 M
2;i




￿i);￿), i￿ s expected




















28while for b mi = ([￿0]; b m2
i; b m3
i; b m4
i); it is easily checked that as b m2
i tends to in￿nity, i￿ s expected payo⁄s
tend toward the expression above. Hence, choosing b m2
i large enough, b mi is a better response against
￿i for player i than mi, a contradiction.








i , it follows player i must be convinced that each other player





















j for all j. Now,
proceed by contradiction and assume that [￿0] 6= [￿] and so that ￿ = 2 [￿0]. By strict Maskin





























is a best reply assigns probability one to each player l 6= j sending a






. Hence, player j￿ s expected payo⁄ from playing mj is





















player j believes with probability one that Rule 2 (i) will be triggered. Hence, player j￿ s expected
payo⁄ would be
￿
1 ￿ 1=(b m2
j + 1)
￿
uj(y([￿0];￿);￿) + (1=(b m2
j + 1))uj(zj([￿0];[￿0]);￿):
Note that as ^ m2








. Hence for ^ m2







a contradiction. Thus [￿0] = [￿] as claimed.
Completion of proof. Claims 1, 2 and 3 together imply that for each ￿ : S
M;￿




i = 1 and m1
i = [￿]. Thus SM;￿ 6= ? and m 2 SM;￿ ) g (m) = f (￿).
29